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DISABLING AMERICA: COSTING OUT THE
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT
Thomas H. Barnardt

INTRODUCTION
Who can deny that the Americans with Disabilities Act
("ADA")' is a well-intentioned statute designed to protect and
aid the disabled? Congress certainly reflected such aspirations
as it overwhelmingly passed the ADA.2 Nevertheless, the
ADA's high purpose and strong congressional support mask an
otherwise problematic statute. Some of the ADA's flaws, such
as the precedential uncertainty that results from an individualized, case-by-case approach to claim determination, appear
inherent to disability legislation.3 In contrast, the ADA's most
troubling defect, the decision to saddle American businesses
with the ADA's resulting costs, represents a congressional error
in discretionary policy formulation. This article will demonstrate that Congress foisted the ADA's costs upon the business
sector without any plausible justification.
I. BACKGROUIND
Congressional thinking in certain quarters can be characterized as follows: The country has a problem. The government
cannot or will not solve the problem. Therefore, the government
should pass a law requiring businesses to solve the problem

t B.A. 1961, University of Puget Sound; LL.B. 1964, Columbia Law School;
LL.M. 1970, Case Western Reserve Law School. Thomas H. Barnard is a
partner in the Cleveland law firm of Duvin, Cahn & Barnard, whose practice
is exclusively devoted to representing management in labor and employment
matters.
1 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (Supp. H 1990).
2The Senate passed its version of the ADA on September 7, 1989 by a vote
of 76 to 8. Senate Passageof Civil Rights Bill Moves Debate Over Disabledto
House, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 174, at A-5 (Sept. 11, 1989). The House of
Representatives passed its bill on May 22, 1990 by a vote of 403 to 20. House
Overwhelmingly Approves Bill to Bar Employment Bias Against Disabled,
Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 100, at A-16 (May 23, 1990).
' See Thomas H. Barnard, The Americans With DisabilitiesAct: Nightmare for Employers and Dream for Lawyers?, 64 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 229, 231
(1990) (noting that the ADA, perhaps out of necessity, forces an individualized
inquiry into many of its enforcement issues).
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regardless of whether or not the business sector caused the
problem or derives any benefit from the solution. Play-or-pay
employer mandate health care proposals provide an illustrative
example of this type of congressional thinking, as they are
intended to solve the nation's health care crisis by requiring
employers to directly provide employee health insurance or to
pay a payroll tax into a government sponsored program. But
why? The business sector did not cause the problem and does
not profit by such a solution.4 Correspondingly, the ADA requires employers not only to refrain from discriminating against
the disabled5 (a perfectly reasonable requirement) but, among
other things, to reasonably accommodate individual disabilities.6 Moreover, Congress has clearly indicated that the required
cost of accommodation may be more than a de minimis
7
sum.

Who cares what the ADA costs the business sector! This
was one panelist's response to a question concerning the ADA's
expected financial burden upon the business sector.' Likewise,
advocacy groups apparently do not care what the ADA costs the
business sector. A recent survey of twenty-five advocacy groups
dedicated to advancing the interests of disabled individuals
found that the advocacy groups believe that the business sector
should pick up the tab for ADA compliance and that employment-related accommodations and barrier removals are simply
a cost of doing business

' The Employee Benefit Research Institute (EBRI) estimates that under a
9% payroll tax, a play-or-pay plan could increase employer costs by $30 billion
to $45 billion. EBRI Issues Comprehensive Review of Health Reform Proposal
Costs, Implications, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 79, at A-13 (April 23, 1992).
Moreover, EBRI estimates that play-or-pay plans could result in a loss of
anywhere from 131,000 to 965,000 jobs. Id.

5 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (Supp. II 1990).
6 Id. § 12112(b)(5)(A)-(B).
"The Committee wishes to make it clear that the principles enunciated by
the Supreme Court in TWA v. Hardison,[432] U.S. 63 (1977) are not applicable to this legislation. In Hardison,the Supreme Court concluded that under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 an employer need not accommodate
persons with religious beliefs if the accommodation would require more than
a de minimis cost for the employer." H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess.,
pt. 2, at 68 (1990) [hereinafter HOUSE REPORT].
' Robert H. Holdsworth, Remarks at the Cornell Journal of Law and
Public Policy ADA Symposium (Mar. 28, 1992).
9

Americans with DisabilitiesAct Survey: A Clash Between Employers and
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Someone should care what the ADA costs the business
sector! In 1991, 87,266 businesses failed in the United States,
up 43.7% from 1990.10 Moreover, in 1991 the dollar liabilities
of failed businesses increased 95.9% to $108.8 billion, up from
$55.5 billion in 1990." Additionally, 1991 represented the
seventh
consecutive year that bankruptcy filings have increa2
1

sed.

What is particularly troubling about the ADA is that Congress did not even make a halfhearted effort to consider how the
Act's costs would affect the business sector. After lengthy
consideration concerning the legislation's benefits, 3 the Senate
gave short shrift to the associated business costs. Under a
section labeled "Economic Impact on the Individuals, Consumers
and Businesses Affected,"' 4 the Senate first concluded that
"[s]avings

to the public and private sectors in the form of increa-

sed earnings for people with disabilities and decreased government benefit and private insurance and benefit payments is
estimated to be in the billions of dollars per year."' 5 Next, in
its only discussion of the ADA's business costs, the Senate explained that:
[c]osts to businesses for reasonable accommodations are
expected to be less than $100.00 per worker for 30% of
workers needing an accommodation, with 51% of those
needing an accommodation requiring no expenses at all.
A Louis Harris national survey of people with disabilities found that among those employed, accommodations were provided in only 35% of the cases. For reno-

Advocacy Groups, Business Wire, Jan. 20, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, BWIRE File (citing survey commissioned by the law firm of Blank,
Rome, Comisky & McCauley and Alexander & Alexander Consulting Group
Inc.).
10

1991 Business Failures Soar 44 Percent to Record Level; Liabilities

Nearly Double to $109 Billion, Business Wire, Feb. 20, 1992, available in

LEXIS, Nexis Library, BWIRE File (citing the Dun & Bradstreet Corp.).
" Id. (quoting Joseph W. Duncan, vice president and corporate economist

for the Dun & Bradstreet Corp.).
' Bankruptcies up 21% in '91, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 3, 1992, at D6.
13 S. REP. No. 116, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 5-20 (1989) [hereinafter SENATE
REPORT].
14Id. at 89.
'5 Id.

44

CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol.2:41

vation and new construction, costs of accessibility are
generally between zero and one percent of the construction budget.'6
The House of Representatives
did not even discuss the ADA's
7
sector.'
business
the
costs to
II. BUSINESS AS USUAL
Before considering the ADA's special or unusual costs, it is
useful to examine the costs it will generate simply because it is
a new statute. Most responsible employers will:
1. train human resource personnel and supervisors
regarding their obligations under the new statute
(these costs include actual training expenses and opportunity costs);
2. revise job applications to eliminate unlawful questions regarding health"8 or prior workers' compensation claims;' 9
3. revise job descriptions (while the ADA does not
require employers to develop or maintain job descriptions,' ° many employers will probably review their job
descriptions and consider revising them to properly
denote the "essential functions" of a job);2 '
4. change medical examination procedures and train
company medical personnel to assure compliance with
the statute (for example, businesses are prohibited from
conducting pre-offer physicals);2
5. modify manuals and interview guidelines to eliminate discriminatory or unlawful references; and

16 Id.

17 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 7.
8

An employer cannot inquire into whether an individual has a disability

at the pre-offer stage of the selection process. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.13(a) (1992).
However, an employer may make pre-employment inquires into the ability of
an applicant to perform job related functions. Id. § 1630.14(a).
19 29 C.F.R. app. §1630.13(a) (1992).
Id. app. § 1630.2(n).
21

Id. (noting that established job descriptions are relevant in determining

whether a particular function is essential).
22Id. §§ 1630.13-.14 (1992).

1992]

COSTING OUT TiE ADA

6. review their collective bargaining agreements and
meet with Union representatives regarding their mutual ADA obligations.
In addition to taking a proactive approach, many employers
will also find themselves in a defensive posture as they respond
to discrimination claims filed with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC)2 3 and to other lawsuits.
Evan Kemp, Chairman of the EEOC, estimates that the agency
will receive 12,000 to 15,000 additional complaints per year as
a result of the ADA's implementation.'
Many people may justify the ADA-related defense costs with
the following accountability argument: "Who cares? After all,
the respondents are accused of discriminating." However, this
argument not only runs counter to American notions of justice,
but it is also inconsistent with the EEOC's investigatory track
record. In fiscal year 1988, the EEOC closed 70,922 charges,
52.4% after complete investigation. 2' By EEOC definition, only
15% of the closed cases had merit in that there was either a
settlement, withdrawal of the charge with benefits to the charging party, or a "cause" finding which resulted in successful or
unsuccessful conciliation.
It is important to note that an employer will incur response
expenses for every ADA charge filed (even the meritless claims).
These expenses include furnishing documents, answering
questionnaires, giving testimonies, and submitting formal position statements. Additionally, employers who actually have to
defend an ADA lawsuit will likely incur substantial discovery
costs and attorney fees. Employers will also incur indirect
costs. Such costs include time that management and human resource personnel will need to spend at depositions, in respond-

' The EEOC is empowered to remedy ADA violations. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12117
(Supp. II 1990), 2000e-5 (1988).
4 Most Workers Would Accept Changes in Duties, Hours to Accommodate
Disabled Workers, BNA Survey Finds, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 11, at A-2
(Jan. 16, 1992).
' EEOC ObtainedRecord Benefits, Reduced ChargeInventory in FY 1988,
Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 209, at A-5 (Oct. 28, 1988).
6
Id. It can be argued that in many instances settlements and withdrawal
of charges with benefits to the charging party are simply an expeditious
means for the employer to avoid further expense. Since neither scenario
represents an actual finding of discrimination, the EEOC calculation of
meritorious cases may be inflated.
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ing to written discovery requests, and appearing as witnesses at
trial.
Employers can also expect to incur costs arising out of the
Civil Rights Act of 1991." This statute was originally intended to overrule and respond to several U.S. Supreme Court
employment discrimination decisions, 3 including Wards Cove
Packing Co. v. Atonio.2 ' However, by the time it became law,
the coverage was greatly expanded and now provides for, among
other things, compensatory and punitive damages as well as
jury trials for claims of intentional discrimination under Title
VII and the ADA.30 The expanded damages and jury trials
will result in greater employer liability exposure and, correspondingly, more ADA lawsuits. House Minority members
echoed this view prior to the ADA's final passage:
The Committee is now considering the Civil Rights Act
of 1990, which among many other things, would amend
Title VII remedies to include punitive and compensatory damages. These proposed changes to Title VII, in
the view of the Minority Members, would thus, by fiat,
undermine and reverse the underlying agreement
which led to the passage of the ADA by the Senate.
Employers, in short, are now facing the prospect of
punitive and compensatory damages under a new statute imposing many novel requirements unfamiliar to
most businesses in the private sector. This prospect
threatens to undermine all support for this legislation
and is the one issue which will result in complete
opposition to the bill by the entire business communi31

ty.

Expanding on the House Minority view, it is important to note
that the substantive law prohibiting race, gender, national

27

Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991).

2 H.R. REP. No. 40, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 1-4 (1991).

- 490 U.S. 642, 657, 659 (1989) (holding that to establish prima facie case
of disparate impact under Title VII, employees must show that any racial
disparity in the workplace results from specific employment practices; furthermore, plaintiffs retain burden of persuasion in showing that such practices are
not justified by legitimate business needs).
" See Civil Rights Act of 1991, supra note 27, § 102.
31 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 7, at 167 (emphasis added).
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origin, religious, and age discrimination serves as a useful guide
for employer behavior. Employers generally know what actions
will constitute a Title VII violation. In contrast, because the
ADA is so new, employers lack a useful behavioral guide.
III. THE ADA'S SPECIAL COST PROBLEMS
A. INDIVIDUALIZED, CASE-BY-CASE ANALYSIS

Unlike other types of discrimination claims, the ADA,
beginning with the definition of who is disabled and working
through the most fundamental issues of what is a reasonable
accommodation and what constitutes an undue hardship defense, requires a case-by-case, individualized resolution.3 2
Congress and the EEOC unabashedly support the case-by-case
approach. The EEOC Technical Assistance Manual33 notes
that:
[u]nder other laws that prohibit employment discrimination, it usually is a simple matter to know whether
an individual is covered because of his or her race,
color, sex, national origin or age. But to know whether
a person is covered by the employment provisions of the
ADA can be more complicated. It is first necessary to
understand the Act's very specific definitions of "disability" and "qualified individual with a disability."
Like other determinations under the ADA, deciding
who is a "qualified" individual is a case-by-case process,
depending on the circumstances
of the particular em34
situation.
ployment
Ultimately, the ADA's case-by-case analysis will inhibit the
development of meaningful precedent, and, consequently, the
EEOC, employers, and employees will be forced to seek guidance directly from the courts. Moreover, the courts will not be
2

See generally Barnard, supra note 3 (discussing at length the problems

associated with a case-by-case, individualized approach).
13 EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNrrY COMM'N, TECHNIcAL ASSISTANCE
MANUAL FOR THE AMERIcANS WITH DIsABILrTEs AcT (1992) [hereinafter

EEOC MANUAL].

Id. § 2.1; see also id. § 3.9 (noting that a determination regarding
whether a particular accommodation will impose an undue hardship must be
made on a case-by-case basis).
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able to easily resolve ADA cases. Summary judgments, which
courts frequently use to eliminate frivolous Title VII claims, will
be difficult to grant within a case-by-case framework. As such,
employers will carry an extra litigation burden peculiarly

inherent to the ADA.
B. DEFINITIONS OF DISABILITY AND QUALIFIED PERSON
WITH A DISABILITY

In virtually all other types of discrimination cases, there is
almost never an issue about whether the plaintiff is protected.
Rarely, if ever, does a defendant dispute whether or not the
plaintiff is over forty, Afro-American, Hispanic or female.
However, determining who is actually disabled is quite another
matter. In many instances, disability determination will become a threshold question which, in turn, will increase litigation
costs. While determining who has a "disability," 5 who is a
"qualified individual with a disability,"3 and what are the
"essential functions"3 of a job will entail substantial costs even
for claims involving well-meaning plaintiffs, this process is especially susceptible to abuse by the dishonest employee.
The same type of employee who feigns a job injury or takes
extended time away from the job can be counted on to seek
special treatment ("reasonable accommodation") at the
workplace. Here, subjective types of injuries or illnesses, i.e.,
those where no objective medical evidence exists, will be the
most troublesome form of abuse, as the medical professional will
be forced to rely solely on the claimant's communications to
determine the existence of a disability.
Stress is an example of a subjective illness.33 The EEOC
notes that stress is a condition which may or may not be considered an impairment depending on whether it results from a

35 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (Supp. H 1990); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g) (1992).
36 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (Supp. II 1990); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m) (1992).
3742 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (Supp. II 1990); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n) (1992).
38 Stress related impairments are presently popular in workers' compensation circles. Consider, for example, the employee who unsuccessfully sought
workers' compensation benefits for hyperventilation and anxiety attacks after

learning that there had been two mouse sightings in the workplace. Marsico
v. Workmen's CompensationAppeal Bd., 588 A.2d 984 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1991).
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documented physiological or mental disorder.
provides an example:

9

The EEOC

A person suffering from general "stress" because of job
or personal life pressures would not be considered to
have an impairment. However, if this person is diagnosed by a psychiatrist as having an identifiable stress
disorder,s/he would have an impairment that may be
a disability. °
Here, the employee will simply need to find a psychiatrist who
is willing to state that the employee has an "identifiable stress
disorder.""'
An identifiable stress disorder could, among other things, be
an "adjustment disorder." Pursuant to the Diagnostic and
StatisticalManual of Mental Disorders,Third Edition, Revised
(the "DSM-III-R"), the psychiatrists' authoritative source, the
essential feature of an "adjustment disorder" is:
a maladaptive reaction to an identifiable psycho-social
stressor, or stressors, that occurs within three months

EEOC MANUAL, supra note 33, § 2.1(a)(i).
oId. (emphasis added).

4

41

California and several other states have recognized workers' compensa-

tion claims for stress related disorders that are unaccompanied by any
physical injury. See, e.g., Horn v. Bradco Int'l, Ltd., 283 Cal. Rptr. 721 (Ct.
App. 1991) (relegating plaintiff's intentional infliction of emotional distress
claim to workers' compensation system even though claim unaccompanied by
physical injury); Jones v. City of New Orleans, 514 So. 2d 611, 613 (La. Ct.
App. 1987) (holding that plaintiff entitled to compensation benefits even
though post-traumatic stress disorder unaccompanied by physical trauma to
the body); writ denied, 515 So. 2d 1111 (La. 1987); Cerami v. Rochester City
Sch. Dist., 538 N.Y.S.2d 644, 645 (App. Div. 1989) (noting that employment
induced psychological injury is unquestionably compensable); McGarrah v.
State Accident Ins. Fund Corp., 675 P.2d 159, 170 (Or. 1983) (holding that
under Oregon Workers' Compensation Statute, stress-caused claims for
benefits arising out of mental disorders are compensable if they flow from the
conditions of the worker's employment); Johnson v. State, ex rel. Wyo. Workers'
Compensation Div., 798 P.2d 323 (Wyo. 1990) (holding that post-traumatic
stress disorder and spontaneous major depression arising out of motor vehicle
accident which occurred in course of employment is compensable under
Wyoming workers' compensation law where there is no accompanying physical
injury).
4 AMERicAN PsYcHIAmIc ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIc AND STATISTICAL
MANUAL OF MENTAL DISoRDERs (3d. ed. rev. 1987).
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after onset of the stressor, and has persisted for no
longer than six months. The maladaptive nature of the
reaction is indicated either by impairment in occupational (including school) functioning or in usual social
activities or relationship with others or by symptoms
that are in excess
of a normal and expectable reaction
3
to the stressor1

What happens if a psychiatrist makes such a diagnosis in accord
with the DSM-III-R? Does the diagnosed "adjustment disorder"
then give rise to the level of a "disability" within the meaning of
ADA? Other potential problem areas under the ADA include
the traditionally troublesome workers' compensation cases;
namely, bad backs, carpal tunnel syndrome, and more recently,
VDT induced eye strain. The subjective nature of these ailments generate many suspect cases. As such, the employee who
is willing to make a false workers' compensation claim will
likely exploit the ADA to procure part-time work, light work, a
cushy job, or some other concession.
After initially determining whether an employee or applicant is disabled, typical ADA analysis will then consider whether or not the person is a "qualified individual with a disability."
In defining this term, the ADA introduces an additional concept:
that to be "qualified," the individual need only be able to perform the "essential functions" of a job." In determining what
constitutes essential job functions, the evidence to be considered
includes:
1. the employer's judgment as to which functions are
essential;
2. written job descriptions prepared before advertising
or interviewing applicants for the job;
3. the amount of time spent on the job performing the
function;
4. the consequences of not requiring the incumbent to
perform the function;
5. the terms of a collective bargaining agreement; and

4 Id. at 329 (emphasis added).
42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (Supp. II 1990). "The term 'qualified individual
with a disability' means an individual with a disability who, with or without
reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position that such individual holds or desires." Id.
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6. work experience of people who have performed the
job in the past and/or work experiences of people who
currently perform similar jobs.45
Making this determination will be no simple feat and, once
again, will undoubtedly give rise to litigation.
An inquiry into what constitutes the essential functions of
a job also raises a more fundamental question. What happens
to the so-called marginal job functions? It is not as if they
disappear. Someone must perform them. For example, what if
a secretary who uses a wheelchair is unable to perform filing
functions (and, for the sake of argument, it is concluded that
filing is not an essential job function). Someone will have to
perform the job's filing requirement. Will it be another secretary? The secretary's supervisor? A manager? A file clerk?
Someone will have to take on the task and, consequently, add a
duty to their responsibilities. This person may want additional
pay. Also, supervisors or managers who take on the duty may
resent the different treatment, because, unlike their peers, they
would be required to do their own filing.
Union jobs may create contractual problems as the employee who is assigned the additional tasks could grieve the unequal
treatment. Also, should a grievance arise, or even a question,
what does the employer do if the disability is not obvious?
According to the ADA, the disabled person's medical records are
largely confidential.46 Hence, an employer may not be able to
explain to the complaining employee or to the union its reason
for providing the disabled person with special treatment. In
another scenario, the reassignment of so-called marginal job
duties could give rise to discriminatory and/or comparable pay
claims if a member of the opposite sex or a different race receives the additional job duties.4

45
46

29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3) (1992).
29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(b)(1)-.14(d)(1) (1992).

4' Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 253, as amended, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2000e-17 (1988) makes it an unfair employment practice for an
employer to discriminate against any individual with respect to hiring or the
terms and conditions of employment because of such individual's race, color,
religion, gender, or national origin.
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C. THE DUTY TO PROVIDE REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION
The duty to provide reasonable accommodation" to a disabled applicant or employee is a key concept under the ADA. It
sets disability discrimination apart from almost any other type
of prohibited discrimination.4 9 The basic rationale behind
discrimination legislation is to treat everyone equally. However,
the ADA demands an employer to favor disabled persons, at
least under certain circumstances. The EEOC Technical Assistance Manual summarizes the reasonable accommodation
obligation:
*

An employer must provide a reasonable accommodation
to the known physical or mental limitations of a qualified applicant or employee with a disability unless it
can show that the accommodation would impose an
undue hardship on the business.
Reasonable accommodation is any modification or
adjustment to a job, an employment practice, or the
work environment that makes it possible for an individual with a disability to enjoy an equal employment
opportunity.
The obligation to provide a reasonable accommodation
applies to all aspects of employment. This duty is
ongoing and may arise any time that a person's disability or job changes.
An employer cannot deny an employment opportunity
to a qualified applicant or employee because of the need
to provide reasonable accommodation, unless it would
cause an undue hardship.50

•

*

*

The EEOC has identified the following examples as reasonable accommodations that an employer may be required to
undertake:
making facilities readily accessible to and usable by an
individual with a disability;

4

29 C.F.R. § 1630.9 (1992).
also have an affirmative obligation to reasonably accommo-

4' Employers

date an employee's religious beliefs. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (1988).
' EEOC MANUAL, supra note 33, § 3.1.

1992]
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restructuring a job by reallocating or redistributing
marginal job functions;
altering when or how an essential job function is performed;
part-time or modified work schedules;
obtaining or modifying equipment or devices;
modifying examinations, training materials or policies;
providing qualified readers and interpreters;
reassignment to a vacant position;
permitting use of accrued paid leave or unpaid leave for
necessary treatment;
providing reserved parking for a person with a mobility
impairment;
allowing an employee to provide equipment or devices
that an employer is not required to provide.51

*
*
•
*
*
•
•
"

There is little doubt that in many instances accommodation52
will be possible with very little or no cost to an employer.
Moreover, the suggestion that employers consult with the
disabled person for the purpose of determining how she may be
accommodated53 will in many instances be beneficial to the
employer. The disabled person may have lived with the disability for a long time or may have received training in ways to
overcome her disability and, consequently, will be able to make
helpful, practical suggestions. However, the EEOC's list of
possible accommodations' clearly reveals that such inexpensive, practical accommodations are not the only ones contemplated. Qualified readers and interpreters,55 for example,
could be expensive, since this remedy entails extra people,

51

EEOC MANUAL, supra note 33, § 3.5.
A number of publications have published lists containing examples of
inexpensive accommodations. But consider the following example: "An
individual with dyslexia working as a police officer had trouble filling out
forms at the end of the day. Providing him with a tape recorder and allowing
a secretary to type out his reports allowed him to continue in his job. Actual
cost: $69.00." Reasonable Accommodations, THE INFORMED EXECUTIVE
(Employers Resource Council, Seven Hills, Ohio), Nov. 1, 1992 at 3 (emphasis
added). Assuming that the tape recorder cost $69.00, are we to assume that
the secretary's time is free?
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(0)(3); EEOC MANUAL, supra note 33, § 3.7.
EEOC MANUAL, supra note 33, § 3.5.
65 Id.
52
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salaries, and benefits. Modifying equipment, devices, and
exams 56 could also be quite costly. Likewise, providing for
part-time work and paid or unpaid leave57 may entail substantial expense, especially if another person must be hired or paid
overtime to perform the disabled person's work.
ADA proponents will argue that Congress provided an
"undue hardship""8 defense whereby not every "mom-and-pop"
business will be required to hire interpreters, make significant
alterations in equipment or permit a disabled person to work
part-time when the business needs a full-time person. However,
Congress has made it clear that the "undue hardship" defense
will not be easy to establish as employers must demonstrate
that the hardship is more than de minimis."9
Correspondingly, the EEOC, in issuing the Technical Assistance Manual, accurately reflected congressional intent when it
stated that "whether a particular accommodation will impose an
undue hardship must always be determined on a case-by-case
basis."60 The Commission further stated that:
[an accommodation that poses an undue hardship for
one employer at a particular time may not pose an
undue hardship for another employer, or even for the
same employer at another time. In general, a larger
employer would be expected to make accommodations
requiring greater effort or expense than would be required of a smaller employer.6 1
The EEOC then explained that the concept of "undue hardship"
includes any action that is unduly costly, extensive, substantial,
disruptive, or that would fundamentally alter the nature or
operation of the business. 2
Expanding on what may be unduly costly, the EEOC rejected the notion, based once again on congressional intent, that an
employer may claim "undue hardship" because the cost of an

56 Id.
57

Id.

5 29 C.F.R. § 1630.9(a) (1992).
59 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 7 and accompanying text.
6
61

EEOC MANUAL, supra note 33, § 3.9.
Id.

62 Id.
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accommodation is high in relation to an employee's wage or
salary.63 Hence, there is no cost-benefit analysis and, consequently, an employer may be required to hire two persons to
perform one job, e.g., an interpreter or reader as well as the
disabled person.'
One of the most difficult and potentially costly problems
associated with the "undue hardship" defense is determining its
relationship to union policy and collective bargaining agreements. What role will the union play if it has negotiated an
agreement with an employer to fill vacant positions by seniority,
but the employer awards the position to an ADA candidate?
Similarly, how will the union respond to reallocation of marginal job duties to union employees? So far, the EEOC has not resolved these questions except to note that "[t]he terms of a
collective bargaining agreement may be relevant in determining
whether an accommodation would impose an undue hardship."65 This issue is of great concern not only to unionized
employers but, obviously, to the unions themselves. Unions
may have their own members vying against each other and
could easily find themselves defending section 30166 duty of
fair representation actions regardless of the positions they take.

' "An employer may not claim undue hardship simply because the cost of
an accommodation is high in relation to an employee's wage or salary. When
enacting the ADA "factors" for determining undue hardship, Congress rejected
a proposed amendment that would have established an undue hardship if an
accommodation exceeded 10% of an individual's salary. This approach was
rejected because it would unjustifiably harm lower-paid workers who need
accommodations. Instead, Congress clearly established that the focus for determining undue hardship should be the resources available to the employer."
Id.
r In Nelson v. Thornburgh, 567 F.Supp. 369 (E.D. Pa. 1983) affd mem.,
732 F.2d 146 (3d Cir. 1984) cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1188 (1985), the court held,
in a case arising under the section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 87
Stat. 355 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1988)) (protects disabled
Americans from discrimination by any program or activity receiving federal
financial assistance) that the state of Pennsylvania discriminated against
blind welfare agency workers, who were responsible for receiving and recording information from welfare applicants, by refusing to provide them with
half-time readers or their mechanical equivalent.
Frankly, this case can and hopefully will be distinguished in the event
like factors give rise to a private sector case.
EEOC MANUAL, supra note 33, § 3.9 (emphasis added).
Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act § 301, 29 U.S.C. § 185
(1988).
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In summary, the reasonable accommodation/undue hardship
issues present the greatest and costliest challenge to employers.
D. DIRECT THREAT DEFENSE
Another issue which has the potential to be a sizable cost to
employers arises from the "direct threat" defense. According to
the EEOC, "[a]n employer may require as a qualification standard that an individual not pose a 'direct threat' to the health or
safety of the individual or others, if this standard is applied to
all applicants for a particular job.""7 The EEOC qualifies this
defense by stating quite accurately that "an employer must
meet very specific and stringent requirements under the ADA to
establish that such a 'direct threat' exists. 68
In general, the employer must be prepared to identify:
*
*
*
*

a significant risk of substantial harm;
a specific risk;
a current risk, not one that is speculative or remote;
an assessment of risk based on objective medical or
other factual evidence regarding a particular individual; and
whether the risk can be eliminated or reduced below
the level of a "direct threat" by reasonable accommodation, even if a genuine significant risk of substantial
harm exists.6"

•

One issue that is certain to arise from these requirements is
determining whether the risk is "current" as opposed to "speculative" or "remote." According to the EEOC:
The employer must show that there is a current risk"a high probability of substantial harm" - to health or
safety based on the individual's present ability to perform the essential functions of the job. A determination that an individual would pose a "direct threat"
cannot be based on speculation about future risk. This
includes speculationthat an individual'sdisability may
become more severe. An assessment of risk cannot be
67 EEOC MANUAL, supra note 33, § 4.5.
68

5 Id.

69 Id.
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based on speculation that the individual will become
unable to perform a job in the future, or that this individual may cause increasedhealth insuranceor workers'
compensation costs, or will have excessive absenteeism.70
In determining what is current the EEOC also speaks of "imminence," i.e., the risk must be imminent. Here, the EEOC gives
an example of a bad back: "A physician's evaluation of an applicant for a heavy labor job that indicated the individual had a
disc condition that might worsen in eight or ten years would not
71
be sufficient indication of imminent potential harm.
Does this requirement mean an employer must hire an
applicant to perform a heavy lifting job where an x-ray reveals
a bad disc condition but it does not presently manifest itself in
such a way that the applicant cannot physically perform the job
in question? What if the physician says it might worsen in two
days? Two months? Two years? Or, more likely, it could be
two days, two months or two years, but it will happen.
A bad heart condition poses similar problems. Will the
physician be able to say that the potential for harm posed by
the heart condition is "imminent" if the person does heavy
lifting? In many instances, probably not. Also, what if an
employer does know that an employee has a bad heart condition
and hires or promotes that individual to a heavy labor job (e.g.,
a janitor shovelling snow or an operator lifting heavy pieces of
steel)? This will be virtual homicide, and in some states, the
employee's family may have a credible claim. In Ohio, for
instance, the law allows employees who are victims of employer
intentional torts to escape the exclusivity of workers' compensation law and, consequently, to recover both at common law and
under workers' compensation law. Here, Ohio employers are
potentially liable for compensatory and punitive damages at
common law if they. either intend to harm their employees or
require them to work under conditions the employer knows are

oId. (third and fourth emphasis added) (citation omitted).
71 Id.

72

Brady v. Safety-Kleen Corp., 576 N.E.2d 722, 730 (Ohio 1991) (striking
down statute that limited employee common law recovery for intentional tort
to excess of workers' compensation recovery).
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substantially certain to cause injury.73 Will the ADA be a
defense to such claims?
As the foregoing discussion illustrates, there is no doubt
that the ADA is going to be an expensive proposition to at least
some employers if not to all employers. But why should the
employer pay?
IV. WHY SHOULD THE EMPLOYER PAY?
Clearly, except in some unusual circumstances, an employer
will not benefit from accommodating a person who is disabled,
who poses a threat of injury to himself or others or who cannot
perform all the job functions. The ADA would not be necessary
if these scenarios were beneficial to employers as they automatically act in ways that promote their self interests. While this
realization is not unique to the ADA, the ADA is clearly unlike
other employer burdens in that it does not offer a direct link to
the employment relationship itself.
Many labor laws directly regulate labor or employment
itself. The Labor Management Relations Act of 1947"4 regulates relations between labor and management; the Fair Labor
Standards Act 75 regulates employment wages and hours; the
Occupational Safety and Health Act 76 regulates the health and
safety of employees on the job; and workers' compensation laws
provide compensation for workplace injuries. Other laws regulating employment are the direct result of labor performed, such
as federal tax laws which require withholding to pay income
taxes, thus placing an extra burden on employers. In contrast,
the ADA regulates employment in such a way as to solely
perform a social welfare function, i.e., transferring a responsibility from the government, the family, or the disabled individual to someone else, namely an employer.
Such a transfer will affect employers disproportionatelyhitting small employers the hardest. The fact that many accommodations may be made at little or no cost, will not be very
comforting to the employer who gets an applicant with a high
cost disability, such as a person infected with the AIDS virus.

73

Id. at 734 (Brown, J., concurring) (citing Fyffe v. Jeno's, Inc., 570 N.E.2d
1108, 1109 (1991)).
- 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-187 (1988).
Id. §§ 201-219.
76 Id. §§ 651-676.
15
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Likewise, small employers will also encounter problems if they
hire someone who subsequently develops a disability which requires significant accommodation or some other extraordinary
expense 7 - such as part-time employment, leaves of absence,
or special assistance.
Large employers also have reason for concern. Clearly
employer size is a factor to be considered in determining whether or not an accommodation is reasonable or poses an "undue
hardship."' Such criteria would suggest that there may be no
accommodation too substantial for the likes of General Motors.
However, General Motors lost $4.5 billion in 1991."
The dollars will add up, especially if there is no concomitant
benefit to the employer. Moreover, even if an employer can pass
on some or all of the cost to the consumer, American businesses
will struggle to compete in the world market.8 0 In short, Congress simply took business out of its equation when it did a very
superficial cost-benefit analysis of the ADA.
V. ALTERNATIVES
Are there alternatives short of repealing part or all of the
ADA?
A. KEEP THE CAPS
There is currently a bill in Congress called the Equal
Remedies Act of 1991" which is designed to remove the caps

' Consider, for example, the employer in Fleming v. Ayers & Assocs., 948
F.2d 993, 995 (6th Cir. 1991) where an employee gave birth to a hydrocephalic
baby whose medical expenses exceeded $80,000. Similarly, the Clifton Steel
Co., Twinsburg, Ohio, employed a diabetic worker under age 40 who suffered
a heart attack. As a result, the company's monthly insurance rate increased
between $2700 and $3500 to cover the employee's insurance costs. Jay
Greene, EmployerLearns New Business.HealthInsurance,THE PLAIN DEALER,
(Cleveland), Feb. 9, 1992, at 9A.
' EEOC MANUAL, supra note 33, § 3.9.
9 Crisis at GM: Turmoil at the Top Reflects the Depth of Its Troubles,

Bus. WY., Nov. 9, 1992, at 85.
' See David Littman, The Cost of Regulation, Counted in Jobs, WALL ST.
J., Apr. 21, 1992, at A16 (ADA will inflict competitive handicaps on U.S. based
businesses).
8' H.R. 3975, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); S. 2062, 102d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1991).
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on compensatory and punitive awards for victims of intentional
discrimination under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and
the ADA. There are at least two compelling reasons to retain
the caps under the ADA. First, as the House Minority Report
points out, the ADA is a new statute, with new concepts and
many, many unanswered questions. 2 It is fundamentally
unfair to subject an employer to limitless damages regarding
laws which are largely unclear. Secondly, when Congress
passed the ADA an important compromise concerned eliminating a provision for compensatory and punitive damages.8 3 In
short, ADA related caps should be retained for a period of time,
such as ten years, while the law develops and employers gain a
better understanding of their obligations.

B. TAX CREDITS AND DEDUCTIONS
Some tax credits are available under the ADA. Eligible
small businesses may take a tax credit of up to $5000 per year
for accommodations made to comply with the ADA.'
These
credits are limited to one-half the cost of "eligible access expenditures" that are more than $250 but less than $10,250.85 The
ADA also offers tax credits under the Targeted Jobs Tax Credits
Program for employers who hire disabled individuals who are
referred by state or local vocational rehabilitation agencies,
State Commissions on the Blind and the U.S. Department of
Veteran Affairs. 6 Additionally, any business may take a full
tax deduction, up to $15,000 per year, for expenses incurred in
removing specified architectural and transportation barriers."7
These tax incentives are a step in the right direction, but
Congress should go further. Since the employer gets no benefit
from disability accommodations, they merely serve a useful
public purpose (the employment of disabled persons), and,
moreover, since Congress suggests that ADA related costs are
insignificant compared to the benefits," why not pass the ADA
82

HOUSE REPORT, supra note 7, at 167.

3 Id.

EEOC MANUAL, supra note 33, § 3.11(a)(1).
5

a Id.

8 Id. § 3.11(a)(3).
87 Id. § 3.11(a)(2).
' See SENATE REPORT, supra note 13, at 89; HOUSE REPORT, supranote 7,
at 44-47.
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costs on to all taxpayers? This framework would alleviate the
unequal financial burden on the business sector and, consequently, encourage employers to make accommodations.
C. HEALTH CARE COSTS

The cost of health care is presently skyrocketing. 9 At the
same time, one of the ADA's most confusing areas concerns
employers' health insurance obligations.9' The EEOC's regulations fail to clarify this problem. Even assuming the EEOC will
issue a clarification, the ADA can only escalate the business
sector's already alarming health care burdens. The real solution
lies in some form of national health insurance - a plan which
relieves employers of their health care burdens by spreading the
costs to everyone.
D. UNION ISSUES

The EEOC must move forward with regulations that resolve
the conflicts between the ADA and union bargaining agreements. Issues concerning seniority, marginal job requirements
and confidentiality are particularly important. While regulations and guidelines cannot solve all the union related issues,
some effort should be made to lend guidance and protection to
the affected parties.
E. DIRECT THREAT

In regard to establishing a direct threat defense, determination of whether an employee risk is "imminent" or "current" will
pose significant legal problems. Here, the "imminent" or "current" standard should be discarded in favor of an employer
showing that an individual's condition will, with medical certainty, lead to injury, whether current or within several years.
A stricter standard should not be necessary and, ultimately, is
unfair to the employer and the employee/applicant alike.'
89

Sen. Paul Wellstone, upon introducing his bill in the U.S. Senate to

establish a national health insurance system, estimated that health care costs
are likely to rise to $1.6 trillion by the end of the decade. Sen. Wellstone
IntroducesLegislation to EstablishNationalHealthInsurance,Daily Lab. Rep.
(BNA) No. 45, at A-4 (Mar. 6, 1992).
' DisabilitiesAct Raises Questionsfor Employers Over Health Insurance,
Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 51, at A-1 (Mar. 16, 1992).
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CONCLUSION
Congress enacted the ADA without engaging in a costbenefit analysis. This mistake will impose an intolerable
burden upon the business sector, and establishes a bad precedent for future legislation. Implementation of the above suggestions will go a long way toward achieving the ADA's objectives,
and, concomitantly, will allow for realistic business compliance.

